Les Remarques philosophiques sont la première tentative de mettre en oeuvre le programme qui découle de l’échec du projet du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Le noyau de ce programme est donné par l’abandon de l’analyse des nombres avancée dans le Tractatus. Wittgenstein se rend compte que les nombres doivent se trouver à la base même du langage, dans la structure des propositions élémentaires. En même temps, il se rend compte qu’il est impossible de fournir la logique sousjacente au langage avant d’avoir procédé (...) à l’analyse. Le projet d’une investigation logique des phénomènes s’imposait, donc, même après l’abandon de l’idée d’un langage phénoménologique. The Philosophical Remarks is a first attempt at pursuing the philosophical agenda determined by the failure of the Tractarian project. The central point of this agenda is the abandonment of the analysis of number that had been given in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein realizes that numbers should be brought back to the basis of language, as part of the structure of the elementary propositions themselves. At the same time, he realizes that it is impossible to give the logic underlying our language before the process of logical analysis is carried out. He undertakes the project of a logical investigation of phenomena even after giving up the idea of a phenomenological language. (shrink)

Formal series are associated with ascriptions of numbers. They are ordered by formal operations that, unlike negation and disjunction, are not truth-operations. In spite of this, they are required to build propositions involving generic reference to numbers, and are essential to the Tractarian version of the logicist project.

After the works of Jaako Hintikka, David Stern and, more recently, Denis Perrin, the idea that there is a wittgensteinian reflection upon the time and that it is at the origin of the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language is nothing surprising, but we cannot consider it established yet. It seems to me that an important element in this debate is in chapter VII of the Philosophical Remarks : indeed, we find there the very first sustained discussion on (...) the possibility of a phenomenological language —a discussion obviously centred on the question of time. Without aiming to propose an “alternative” reading of Wittgenstein’ reflections on time and the phenomenological language, I would like to bring to light the importance of this chapter for this problem and also try to show that the interpretation key must be looked for in a reductio ad absurdum whose base is the impossibility to measure time. (shrink)

Les Remarques philosophiques sont la première tentative de mettre en oeuvre le programme qui découle de l’échec du projet du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Le noyau de ce programme est donné par l’abandon de l’analyse des nombres avancée dans le Tractatus. Wittgenstein se rend compte que les nombres doivent se trouver à la base même du langage, dans la structure des propositions élémentaires. En même temps, il se rend compte qu’il est impossible de fournir la logique sousjacente au langage avant d’avoir procédé (...) à l’analyse. Le projet d’une investigation logique des phénomènes s’imposait, donc, même après l’abandon de l’idée d’un langage phénoménologique. The Philosophical Remarks is a first attempt at pursuing the philosophical agenda determined by the failure of the Tractarian project. The central point of this agenda is the abandonment of the analysis of number that had been given in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein realizes that numbers should be brought back to the basis of language, as part of the structure of the elementary propositions themselves. At the same time, he realizes that it is impossible to give the logic underlying our language before the process of logical analysis is carried out. He undertakes the project of a logical investigation of phenomena even after giving up the idea of a phenomenological language. (shrink)

O objetivo desta publicação é incentivar a produção filosófica de excelência por parte de pesquisadores notadamente influenciados pela filosofia de Wittgenstein e cujos temas possam suscitar um debate aprofundado. Além de desafiar o empreendimento filosófico contemporâneo, os temas aqui apresentados abordam questões que muitas vezes estão além daquelas consideradas por Wittgenstein em seu tempo. O leitor encontrará neste volume questões relacionadas ao ceticismo semântico e epistêmico, ao relativismo ético, às leituras literárias de Wittgenstein, ao problema das outras mentes e percepção (...) de aspectos, a intersubjetividade e o caráter contrassensual do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, e, também, relacionadas ao Paradoxo de Moore. (shrink)

A negação, no Tractatus, não pode ser tratada como um conceito, tal como acontecia em Frege e em Russell. Se isto acontecesse, p e ~~p deveriam ter sentidos composicionalmente diferentes. A negação não pode se resumir a uma relação lógica entre dois enunciados, pois ~p deve ser construída a partir de p, e não o contrário. A negação é algo que devemos fazer para obter uma proposição a partir de outra (5.23). Ela é produto de uma ação, mas esta ação (...) não pode ser natural (ou meramente humana). Ela deve ser atemporal.AbstractNegation, in the Tractatus, cannot be treated as a concept, as in Frege and Russell. If this were to happen, p and ~~p should have compositionally different meanings. Negation cannot be taken as a logical relationship between two propositions, since ~p must be constructed from p, not the other way round. Negation is something we must do to get one proposition from another (5.23). It is the product of anaction, but this action cannot be natural (or merely human). It must be atemporal. (shrink)

O nome, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, é sempre uma função proposicional. Wittgenstein modifica radicalmente a oposição fregiana entre entidades saturadas e insaturadas. Toda parte sentencial que não seja ela própria uma sentença é insaturada. A proposição é, portanto, uma síntese de funções proposicionais. O nome é o caso-limite de função proposicional. Como qualquer função proposicional, ele pode perfeitamente ser negado.

Der gegenseitige Ausschluß der Farben ist nicht das Problem, worin die Aufgabe des logischen Atomismus Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus wurzelt. Die im Tractatus durchgeführte Analyse der Arithmetik, führte zur Unanwendbarkeit der Zahlen auf die Messungszusammenhänge. Diese Analyse basierte auf einer Lösung, die in den Grundlagen der Arithmetik von Frege abgelehnt worden war. In seinem „Vortrag über die logische Form" zeigt Wittgenstein,daß die Zahlen nicht im Sinne der wiederholten Quantifizierungen definiert werden können. Die bereits in der Grundlage der Sprache eingeführten Zahlen zwingen (...) zur Aufgabe der logischen Unabhängigkeit der Elementarsätze. (shrink)

Wittgenstein objective is to show that Russell’s Theory of Types is condemned to self dissolution. It can only be presented through statements which violate the very rules the theory intends to impinge on the whole of language. On the other hand, if one takes it to be merely a system of rules regarding the usage of signs, it becomes completely arbitrary. The theory of Types presents as an invention something which, from the Tractatus’ point of view, could only be a (...) discovery: the essential structure of reality which is supposed to be presented by language. And then we arrive in the Tractatus at the intermediary solution of an “ineffable essence”. The problem gets even more tangled when the Tractatus comes out unworkable and the idea of reality’s essential structure is jeopardized. Towards the end of the paper I try to offer a Wittgenstein type of inquiry on what is left of the concept of necessity once we abandon the idea that reality is endowed with an essential structure which is supposed to be presented by language. (shrink)

A relação nome–objeto, no Tractatus, exige a atuação de uma vontade. Um sujeito deve “escolher” qual objeto associar a um nome dado. Essa escolha não pode ser descrita – não pode ser um fato no interior do mundo. Do mesmo modo, o sujeito não pode ser um objeto, nem um estado de coisas. Ele deve permanecer fora do mundo, em seus limites lógicos. Ele está conectado ao “quê”, mas não ao “como” – aos objetos, e não aos fatos. É por (...) isso que o sujeito lógico é o portador do ”elemento ético”, e contempla o mundo sub specie aeterni. (shrink)

This book symposium comprises a précis of Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology together with four critical commentaries on different aspects of the book by Marcelo Carvalho, João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter, Marcos Silva and Darlei Dall’Agnol, and the author’s replies.

No quiero dar la impresión de que intentaré una aproximación entre el primero y el segundo Wittgenstein que borre diferencias tan fundamentales cuanto esa. Sin embargo, debo luego aclarar que sí será mi intención hablar de la existencia de "límites" del lenguaje en un sentido que sea asimilable por quien acepta las líneas básicas de argumentación de las Investigaciones Filosóficas. Más exactamente, trataré de redefinir esos límites en términos que sean completamente compatibles con la filosofía madura de Wittgenstein. Asociada a (...) esta nueva definición de la noción de límite, creo que emergirá una nueva concepción de lo Místico, y una suerte muy particular de "teología negativa", que trataré de definir con más exactitud en la parte final mi ponencia. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

Há pelo menos três concepções diferentes de verdade no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. A primeira delas é dada pela tautologia, essa proposição única que pode ser diferentemente obtida aplicando-se operações de verdade às proposições elementares de tal modo que todas as possibilidades de desacordo com a realidade sejam finalmente canceladas. A segunda é dada pelas propriedades internas que podem ser previstas antes que a análise efetiva de nossa linguagem esteja completamente feita. A terceira é dada pelas propriedades internas que apenas a análise (...) lógica pode revelar. Se aceitarmos a interpretação do ?sujeito metafísico? que o autor vem propondo numa série de artigos, então, poderíamos admitir um quarto tipo de necessidade, que tem surpreendentes pontos de contacto com o que poderíamos chamar de ?verdade por convenção? (shrink)

resumo Há razões de ordem estritamente lógica para que Wittgenstein tenha postulado no Tractatus a existência de um sujeito transcendental. Sem esse sujeito, o Tractatus não teria como lidar com a constituição do sentido proposicional. É ele o responsável pela associação entre nomes e objetos e pela efetuação de operações lógicas como a negação, a quantificação e a atribuição numérica. palavras-chave Wittgenstein – lógica – sujeito transcendental – linguagem – sentido – proposição.

Tenta-se especificar uma noção de “limite da linguagem” compatível com a filosofia madura de Wittgenstein. Essa noção é relacionada ao caráter necessariamente público dos critérios. Várias questões são feitas, então, quanto à possível existência de um objeto ou fato cuja identificação dependesse essencialmente de critérios privados. Essas questões revelam-se patentes contrassensos, e esse resultado mostra-se ontologicamente neutro. Assim, as questões filosóficas desaparecem, ao passo que o horizonte místico se mantém.

In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this work (...) is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

: In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this (...) work is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

Harmful but culturally cherished practices often endure in spite of the damages they cause. Meat consumption is increasingly becoming one of such cases and may provide an opportunity from which to observe these phenomena. Growing evidence indicates that current and projected production and consumption patterns are important contributors to significant environmental problems, public health degradation, and animal suffering. Our aim is to contribute to a further understanding of the psychological factors that may hinder or promote personal disposition to change food (...) habits to benefit each of these domains. Drawing from previous evidence, this study explores the proposition that some consumers are motivated to resort to moral disengagement strategies when called upon to consider the impacts of their food habits. Data were collected from six semi-structured focus groups with a sample of 40 participants. Although affirming personal duties towards preserving the environment, promoting public health, and safeguarding animal welfare, participants did not show personal disposition to change their meat consumption habits. Several patterns of response that resonate with the principles of moral disengagement theory were observed while discussing impacts and the possibility of change. Results seem to support the proposition that the process of moral disengagement may play a role in hindering openness to change food habits for the benefit of the environment, public health, and animals, and point towards the relevance of further exploring this approach. (shrink)

Zones of social abandonment are emerging everywhere in Brazil’s big cities—places like Vita, where the unwanted, the mentally ill, the sick, and the homeless are left to die. This haunting, unforgettable story centers on a young woman named Catarina, increasingly paralyzed and said to be mad, living out her time at Vita. Anthropologist João Biehl leads a detective-like journey to know Catarina; to unravel the cryptic, poetic words that are part of the “dictionary” she is compiling; and to trace (...) the complex network of family, medicine, state, and economy in which her abandonment and pathology took form. An instant classic, _Vita_ has been widely acclaimed for its bold fieldwork, theoretical innovation, and literary force. Reflecting on how Catarina’s life story continues, this updated edition offers the reader a powerful new afterword and gripping new photographs following Biehl and Eskerod’s return to Vita. Anthropology at its finest, _Vita_ is essential reading for anyone who is grappling with how to understand the conditions of life, thought, and ethics in the contemporary world. (shrink)

This innovative volume is an extended intellectual conversation about the ways personal lives are being undone and remade today. Examining the ethnography of the modern subject, this preeminent group of scholars probes the continuity and diversity of modes of personhood across a range of Western and non-Western societies. Contributors consider what happens to individual subjectivity when stable or imagined environments such as nations and communities are transformed or displaced by free trade economics, terrorism, and war; how new information and medical (...) technologies reshape the relation one has to oneself; and which forms of subjectivity and life possibilities are produced against a world in pieces. The transdisciplinary conversation includes anthropologists, historians of science, psychologists, a literary critic, a philosopher, physicians, and an economist. The authors touch on how we think and write about contingency, human agency, and ethics today. (shrink)

Zones of social abandonment are emerging everywhere in Brazil’s big cities—places like Vita, where the unwanted, the mentally ill, the sick, and the homeless are left to die. This haunting, unforgettable story centers on a young woman named Catarina, increasingly paralyzed and said to be mad, living out her time at Vita. Anthropologist João Biehl leads a detective-like journey to know Catarina; to unravel the cryptic, poetic words that are part of the “dictionary” she is compiling; and to trace (...) the complex network of family, medicine, state, and economy in which her abandonment and pathology took form. As Biehl painstakingly relates Catarina’s words to a vanished world and elucidates her condition, we learn of subjectivities unmade and remade under economic pressures, pharmaceuticals as moral technologies, a public common sense that lets the unsound and unproductive die, and anthropology’s unique power to work through these juxtaposed fields. _Vita’s_ methodological innovations, bold fieldwork, and rigorous social theory make it an essential reading for anyone who is grappling with how to understand the conditions of life, thought and ethics in the contemporary world. (shrink)

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...) areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as $ \mathcal {C}$n, 1 $ \leq$ n $ \leq$ $ \omega$, is carefully studied. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is (...) to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is, its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$min, stronger than $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, is first presented as a step toward this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of $ \mathcal {C}$min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for $ \mathcal {C}$Lim, the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, $ \mathcal {D}$min is proposed as the dual to $ \mathcal {C}$min. (shrink)

We analyze axioms and postulates as speech acts. After a brief historical appraisal of the concept of axiom in Euclid, Frege, and Hilbert, we evaluate contemporary axiomatics from a linguistic perspective. Our reading is inspired by Hilbert and is meant to account for the assertive, directive, and declarative components of modern axiomatics. We will do this by describing the constitutive and regulative roles that axioms possess with respect to the linguistic practice of mathematics.

In many real-life applications of logic it is useful to interpret a particular sentence as true together with its negation. If we are talking about classical logic, this situation would force all other sentences to be equally interpreted as true. Paraconsistent logics are exactly those logics that escape this explosive effect of the presence of inconsistencies and allow for sensible reasoning still to take effect. To provide reasonably intuitive semantics for paraconsistent logics has traditionally proven to be a challenge. Possible-translations (...) semantics can meet that challenge by allowing for each interpretation to be composed of multiple scenarios. Using that idea, a logic with a complex semantic behavior can be understood as an appropriate combination of ingredient logics with simpler semantic behaviors into which the original logic is given a collection of translations preserving its soundness. Completeness is then achieved through the judicious choice of the admissible translating mappings. The present note provides interpretation by way of possible-translations semantics for a group of fundamental paraconsistent logics extending the positive fragment of classical propositional logic. The logics PI, Cmin, mbC, bC, mCi and Ci, among others, are all initially presented through their non-truth-functional bivaluation semantics and sequent versions and then split by way of possible-translations semantics based on 3-valued ingredients. (shrink)

An overcomplete logic is a logic that ‘ceases to make the difference’: According to such a logic, all inferences hold independently of the nature of the statements involved. A negation-inconsistent logic is a logic having at least one model that satisfies both some statement and its negation. A negation-incomplete logic has at least one model according to which neither some statement nor its negation are satisfied. Paraconsistent logics are negation-inconsistent yet non-overcomplete; paracomplete logics are negation-incomplete yet non-overcomplete. A paranormal logic (...) is simply a logic that is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. -/- Despite being perfectly consistent and complete with respect to classical negation, nearly every normal modal logic, in its ordinary language and interpretation, admits to some latent paranormality: It is paracomplete with respect to a negation defined as an impossibility operator, and paraconsistent with respect to a negation defined as non-necessity. In fact, as it will be shown here, even in languages without a primitive classical negation, normal modal logics can often be alternatively characterized directly by way of their paranormal negations and related operators. So, instead of talking about ‘necessity’, ‘possibility’, and so on, modal logics could be seen just as devices tailored for the study of (modal) negation. This paper shows how and to what extent this alternative characterization of modal logics can be realized. (shrink)

What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (...) (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? (shrink)

We extend meet-combination of logics for capturing the consequences that are common to both logics. With this purpose in mind we define meet-combination of consequence systems. This notion has the advantage of accommodating different ways of presenting the semantics and the deductive calculi. We consider consequence systems generated by a matrix semantics and consequence systems generated by Hilbert calculi. The meet-combination of consequence systems generated by matrix semantics is the consequence system generated by their product. On the other hand, the (...) meet-combination of consequence systems generated by Hilbert calculi is the consequence system generated by their interconnection. We investigate preservation of several properties. Capitalizing on these results we show that interconnection provides an axiomatization for the product. Illustrations are given for intuitionistic and modal logics, Łukasiewicz logic and some paraconsistent logics. (shrink)

Our present moral traits are unable to provide the level of large-scale co-operation necessary to deal with risks such as nuclear proliferation, drastic climate change and pandemics. In order to survive in an environment with powerful and easily available technologies, some authors claim that we need to improve our moral traits with moral enhancement. But this is prone to produce paradoxical effects, be self-reinforcing and harm personal identity. The risks of moral enhancement require the use of a safety framework; such (...) a framework should guarantee practical robustness to moral uncertainty, empirical adequacy, correct balance between dispositions, preservation of identity, and be sensitive to practical considerations such as emergent social effects. A virtue theory can meet all these desiderata. Possible frameworks incorporate them to variable degrees. The social value orientations framework is one of the most promising candidates. (shrink)

We say that things happen accidentally when they do indeed happen, but only by chance. In the opposite situation, an essential happening is inescapable, its inevitability being the sine qua non for its very occurrence. This paper will investigate modal logics on a language tailored to talk about essential and accidental statements. Completeness of some among the weakest and the strongest such systems is attained. The weak expressibility of the classical propositional language enriched with the non-normal modal operators of essence (...) and accident is highlighted and illustrated, both with respect to the definability of the more usual modal operators as well as with respect to the characterizability of classes of frames. Several interesting problems and directions are left open for exploration. (shrink)

O artigo tenta reconstruir alguns elementos acerca da passagem da Lógica da essência para a Lógica do conceito, da necessidade para a liberdade, na Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. No contexto da publicação dos duzentos anos dessa obra filosófica, a explicitação dessa passagem é referencial para a compreensão da Ciência da Lógica e de todo o pensamento hegeliano. O artigo procura sustentar que o binômio necessidade/contingência, um dos pares categoriais da Lógica da essência, não é adequado para a articulação da filosofia (...) hegeliana. Como Hegel afirma reiteradas vezes, é preciso superar a dura necessidade para dar lugar à lógica da liberdade. Para a discussão da problemática, a confrontação entre algumas categorias da essência, tais como substancialidade, necessidade, contingência e causalidade, e algumas categorias do conceito, tais como universalidade, particularidade e singularidade é o foco da exposição. Dessa discussão brota a noção hegeliana de liberdade e a sua relação com o sistema. (shrink)

O jornal Tribuna Criciumense foi o único impresso publicado na cidade de Criciúma no período deste escrito. Fundado em 1955, ele passou por três fases. Na primeira, produziu um discurso anticomunista, mas de maneira um pouco tímida. Na segunda fase, com curta duração, o impresso passou a valorizar a ideologia comunista e, ao mesmo tempo, a defesa do presidente João Goulart. A última fase foi marcada por ataques violentos contra o comunismo, em defesa do golpe civil-militar e da ditadura (...) implantada. Analisar essas fases e como os discursos anticomunista e pró-comunismo reverberaram no jornal se configura no objetivo deste escrito. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the rules that should underlie a computer program that is capable of revising its beliefs or opinions. Such a program maintains a model of its environment, which is updated to reflect perceived changes in the environment. This model is stored in a knowledge base, and the program draws logical inferences from the information in the knowledge base. All the inferences drawn are added to the knowledge base. Among the propositions in the knowledge base, there are (...) some in which the program believes, and there may be others in which the program does not believe. Inputs from the outside world or reasoning carried out by the program may lead to the detection of contradictions, in which case the program has to revise its beliefs in order to get rid of the contradiction and to accommodate the new information. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper: The open society and its enemies -- Ralf Dahrendorf: Liberty and civil society -- Raymond Plant: Social welfare without class warfare -- Gertrude Himmelfarb and Irving Kristol: The moral imagination -- Raymond Aron: The opium of the intellectuals -- Friedrich A. Hayek: The constitution of liberty -- Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and pluralism -- Michael J. Oakeshott: The conservative disposition -- Leo Strauss: Relativism and the crisis of modernity -- Edmund Burke: Liberty and duty -- James Madison vs. (...) Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Two views of self-government -- Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America -- Winston S. Churchill: The English-Speaking Peoples and the Free World -- Limited and accountable Government -- Two kinds of rationalism -- Liberty as conversation. (shrink)

O texto é uma resenha da Doutrina do Conceito hegeliana recém editada e publicada em português. O terceiro livro da Ciência da Lógica é estruturado em subjetividade, objetividade e ideia, com cada uma destas partes também desenvolvida numa estrutura tripartite. Nesta exposição, merece destaque o movimento contraditório de autodeterminação do conceito, no qual a universalidade se autodiferencia imanentemente em particularidade e o conceito retorna a si mesmo na forma da universalidade concreta. O conceito passa pelas diferentes formas de mediação na (...) teoria do silogismo, especialmente com a mediação da universalidade, quando o conceito se transforma em objetividade. Esta começa com a relação externa do mecanismo, avança para a relação interna do quimismo e conclui na teleologia, onde a liberdade é mais elevada que a necessidade. A Ideia, última parte da Doutrina do Conceito, é a unidade sintética entre conceito e objetividade, com destaque no capítulo da Ideia absoluta na qual Hegel formula uma noção de método como estrutura e movimento do conteúdo e da racionalidade. (shrink)

Resenha de: Hegel, G. W. F. Ciência da lógica: 1. A doutrina do ser. Tradução deChristian Iber, Marloren L. de Miranda, Federico Orsini e Agemir Bavaresco. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; Bragança Paulista, SP: Ed.Universitária São Francisco, 2016. 464 p. ISBN 9788532653086.************************************************************************************** ************************************ Com a tradução, os falantes da língua portuguesa têm em mãos uma obra filosófica estruturante do pensamento moderno e uma das mais importantes da História da Filosofia. Temos agora e nossas mãos, em língua portuguesa, uma obra de difícil acesso do (...) pensamento hegeliano e que um filósofo de língua portuguesa leria com muita dificuldade. A tradução, ora disponibilizada, tenta conciliar a difícil linguagem hegeliana escrita em alemão com a fluência típica do nosso português, permitindo uma compreensão mais ou menos fácil por parte do falante da língua portuguesa. (shrink)